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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE 2- LIMITATIONS OF TImE
CPLR 202: Where cause of action accrues to non-domiciliary
outside the state, New York borrowing statute applies.
In Cellura v. Cellura,5 plaintiff, a California domiciliary, was
injured in Texas as a result of an accident with the defendant-
driver. Plaintiff subsequently became domiciled in New York,
where she brought suit against the driver and owner of the vehicle,
both of whom were New York domiciliaries. This seemingly
uncomplicated fact pattern gave rise to two procedural questions:
first, whether the plaintiff was entitled to exclusive application of
the New York statute of limitations by becoming a New York
domiciliary after the cause of action accrued; second, whether, if
the New York statute of limitations did not apply, the Texas statute
of limitations was tolled by the defendant-driver's absence from
Texas subsequent to the accrual of the cause of action.
Since no change was intended in the transition from CPA § 13
to CPLR 202,s when a cause of action accrues outside the state,
the New York borrowing statute will be applied to non-domiciliaries
who, subsequent to the accrual of a cause of action, become domiciled
in New York. Under such circumstances, the court, upon an
examination of both the Texas and New York statutes together
with any relevant tolling provisions, will apply whichever statute
of limitations is the shorter. Therefore, a plaintiff will not be
permitted to avoid the application of a foreign statute of limitations
merely by acquiring a New York domicile.7
Since an application of the three-year New York statute of
limitations would allow the action against both the driver and the
owner in the instant case, it was necessary to consider the Texas
statute of limitations to determine whether it barred the action.
In Texas, as in New York, an absence from the state after
the accrual of a cause of action tolls the statute of limitations for
the duration of the absence However, this toll must be applied
separately to each defendant.
The rule in Texas is that the non-domiciliary defendant must
be present in the state when the cause of action accrues in order
to toll the statute of limitations for the period of defendant's
5 24 App. Div. 2d 59, 263 N.Y.S.2d 843 (4th Dep't 1965).
6 SECOND REP. 46; 7B McKiNNmE's CPLR 202, supp. commentary 11
(1965).7 Public Admin. New York County v. Curiss-Wright Corp., 224 F. Supp.
236, 239-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Garford Trucldng Co. v. Popp, 203 Misc.
554, 118 N.Y.S.2d 158 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1952); 7B McKINmy's CPLR
202, supp. commentary 11 (1965).
a Compare TmE. RE V. Civ. STAT. art. 5537, (1948), w'th CPLR 207.
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absence.9 Therefore, this toll, according to Texas law, had no
application to the defendant-owner since he was never physically
present within Texas to initiate the toll's applicability. In contrast,
prior New York cases indicate that where the non-domiciliary
defendant is outside the State at the accrual of a cause of action,
the statute will be tolled until he comes into the State.10 ' The
result will be the same under the CPLR." However, the court,
utilizing the shorter Texas statute of limitations, dismissed the
action against the owner.
The effect of the Texas statute of limitations on the driver,
who, obviously, was present within Texas when the cause of action
accrued, was not so simply determined. In New York, such a
non-resident's absence would not toll the statute of limitations,
since in personam jurisdiction could be obtained either through
the application of CPLR 302(a) (2) (commission of a tortious act
within the state) or by the non-resident motorist statute.-2 This
result is mandated by CPLR 207 which acts as a limiting force on
CPLR 202, dictating that, if personal jurisdiction can be obtained,
no toll applies, even where the defendant is absent from the state.'3
Although there are few cases on this point, it appears that the
Texas rule is to the contrary.' 4 Therefore, the court refused to
dismiss the action against the driver notwithstanding the availability
of a non-resident motorist statute which subjected the defendant
to in personam jurisdiction even during his absence from the state.
Since both New York and Texas would find the action-against
the driver timely commenced, it was unnecessary to determine
which statute of limitations applied. It would appear, however,
that CPLR 202 would mandate the application of the New York
statute of limitations if three years had expired from the accrual
of the cause of action since the Texas statute would have been
tolled for the duration of defendant's absence from the state.
CPLR 204(a).: Statute of limitations no bar where stipulation with
municipality forced plaintiff to delay commencement of action.
In Robinson v,. City of New York,' 5 the plaintiff, after filing a
timely claim, stipulated with defendant to stay commencement of
OWise v. Anderson, 163 Tex. 608, 359 S.W2d 876 (1962; Simonds v.
Stanolind Oil & Gas. Co., 134 Tex. 332, 114 S.W2d 226 (1938).
10 Ackerman v. Ackerman, 200 N.Y. 72, 93 N.E. 192 (1910) ; In the Matter
of Estate of Morris, 45 Misc. 2d 393, 395, 256 N.Y.S.2d 872, 874 (Surr. Ct.
Nassau County 1965).
"1 SEco REP. 57.2 N.Y. VmHiCLE & TpAmc LAW § 253.
13 7B McKnmnys CPLR 207, commentary 181-82 (1963); SEcOND RM.
57.
14 See, e.g., Simonds v. Stanolind Oil & Gas. Co., supra note 9, at 343,
114 S.W.2d at 233.
15 24 App. Div. 2d 260, 265 N.Y.S2d 566 (Ist Dep't 1965).
